New York Securities Lawyer Blog

Published on: June 19, 2015

Split Decision on Arbitration in Bank of America Case

This week, a Florida appeals court partially reversed a ruling denying Bank of America’s efforts to arbitrate various claims related to the Scott Rothstein Ponzi scheme. Bank of America, N.A. v. Beverly, Nos. 4D14-3167, 4D14-3168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 10, 2015). The appellate court ordered arbitration in a case brought by Douglas Von Allmen, a long-time customer of Bank of America, who alleged that the bank’s improper advice led him to invest in a feeder fund to the Rothstein Ponzi scheme. Von Allmen had entered into a loan agreement with the bank that had a broad arbitration clause, which the court found to be enforceable.

In a second case consolidated for purposes of appeal, the Florida court refused to order arbitration in a case against Bank of America brought by plaintiffs who had no relationship to Bank of America, but who alleged that the bank’s advice to Von Allmen propped up Rothstein’s Ponzi scheme. The court found that these plaintiffs, who were non-signatories to any agreement with Bank of America, could not be forced into arbitration.

For a potential plaintiff, knowing whether your dispute arises from an agreement and whether that agreement has an enforceable arbitration clause can save not only time but also legal costs.

Published on: June 4, 2015

SEC Fines Deutsche Bank $55 Million for Overvaluing Derivatives Portfolio During Financial Crisis

By Lax & Neville LLP

Deutsche Bank has agreed to pay a fine of $55 million to settle charges by the SEC that it filed misstated financial reports during the height of the global financial crisis relating to a multibillion dollar portfolio of derivatives.

The SEC’s multi-year investigation culminated in an Order Instituting a Settled Administrative Proceeding, available on the SEC’s website. According to investigators, the bank overvalued a portfolio of derivatives consisting of Leveraged Super Senior (“LSS”) trades, through which it purchased protection against credit default losses. This leverage created a “gap risk”, which the bank initially took into account in its financial statements, by adjusting down the value of the LSS positions. However, according to the SEC’s Order, when the credit markets started to deteriorate in 2008, Deutsche Bank steadily altered its methodologies for measuring the gap risk. Each change in methodology reduced the value assigned to the gap risk until Deutsche Bank eventually stopped adjusting for gap risk altogether. In other words, the bank slowly tweaked its formula over the months so that the risk didn’t show in its financial reports.

Therefore, “at the height of the financial crisis, Deutsche Bank’s financial statements did not reflect the significant risk in these large, complex illiquid positions”, according to Andrew J. Ceresney, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.

Published on: June 2, 2015

FINRA Releases Second Proposed Broker Compensation Rule for Comment

By Lax & Neville LLP

On May 28, 2015, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) released its second proposed rule designed to help investors understand what financial incentives their broker may have to transition between member firms and how those transitions could affect the customer’s investments. The complete FINRA release regarding the new rule may be found here. FINRA encouraged all interested parties to comment on the proposal no later than July 13, 2015.

Rule 2272 — “Educational Communication Related to Recruitment Practices and Account Transfers” (the “Proposed New Rule”) would require delivery of a FINRA created educational communication focusing on key considerations for customers contemplating transferring their assets, with their broker, to the recruiting firm. According to FINRA, a recruiting firm is any member firm that hires or associates with a registered representative who was previously associated with another member firm. FINRA created the Proposed New Rule because it was concerned that retail customers were not aware of important factors they should consider when making the decision to transfer assets to the transitioning registered representative’s new firm.

FINRA’s educational communication is intended to motivate customers towards making inquiries of the transitioning registered representative and the customer’s current firm, to the extent that the customer considers the content of the educational communication important to his or her decision. Specifically, FINRA’s educational communication highlights the potential implications of transferring assets to the recruiting firm and suggests questions the customer should ask questions regarding: 1) whether financial incentives received by the representative may create a conflict of interest; 2) assets that may not be directly transferrable to the recruiting firm, and, as a result, the customer may incur costs to liquidate and move those assets or incur inactivity fees by leaving them with the current firm; 3) the potential costs related to transferring assets to the recruiting firm, including the difference in the pricing structure and fees imposed between the customer’s current firm and the recruiting firm; and 4) the differences in products and services between the customer’s current firm and the recruiting firm.

Published on: May 26, 2015

LPL Financial LLC Violates FINRA Supervision Rules During Its Expansion

By Lax & Neville LLP

On May 6, 2015, LPL Financial LLC (“LPL”) submitted a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (“AWC”) to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (“FINRA”) Department of Enforcement to settle allegations that LPL violated FINRA supervisory rules. The AWC was submitted “without admitting or denying the findings,” and on the condition that, if accepted, “FINRA will not bring any future actions against LPL alleging violations based on the same factual findings.”

LPL has been a FINRA member firm since 1973, is headquartered in Boston, MA and has approximately 18,343 registered representatives operating from approximately 10,702 registered branch office locations and 18,396 non-registered office locations. LPL is the largest organization of independent financial advisors in the United States based on total revenue. In 2007, LPL Financial Holdings, Inc., LPL’s parent company, expanded LPL’s broker-dealer business by acquiring other financial services firms and recruiting registered representatives from other broker-dealers. From 2007 to 2013, the number of registered representatives at LPL more than doubled from 8,322 to 17,601 and LPL’s revenue increased from $2.28 billion to $4.05 billion. According to FINRA, while LPL’s business grew, LPL failed to similarly increase its supervisory resources, resulting in inadequate supervisory systems and procedures.

Specifically, according to FINRA, LPL failed to properly supervise its representative’s sale of non-traditional exchange traded funds (“non-traditional ETFs”), variable annuities, mutual funds, and illiquid or non-exchange-traded real estate investment trusts (“non-traded REITs”). Non-traditional ETFs are a class of complex products that include leveraged, inverse and inverse-leveraged ETFs, which seek to earn a multiple of the performance of the underlying index or benchmark or earn a return inverse to the return of the benchmark’s performance, or both. Generally, non-traditional ETFs utilize swaps, futures contracts, and other derivatives instruments to achieve these objectives. According to FINRA, LPL failed to review the length of time for which these securities were held by customers, despite written supervisory procedures which require monitoring non-traditional ETFs on a daily basis. This is especially important because many of these products “reset” daily and over time, that resetting function can cause the specific non-traditional ETF’s performance to deviate significantly from the index it tracks. Additionally, the short positions taken by inverse ETFs contain more risk than a corresponding long position because the potential for loss in a short position is limitless. FINRA further alleged that LPL failed to enforce its written supervisory procedures with respect to account allocation limits for non-traditional ETFs, and failed to ensure that its registered representatives were adequately trained to sell non-traditional ETFs. FINRA alleged that LPL violated National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) Rule 3010(b) and FINRA Rule 2010, which state that “[a] member, in the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.”

Published on: May 22, 2015

FINRA’s Regulatory Arm Announces Strengthening of Sanction Guidelines for Fraudulent Conduct by Brokers

By Lax & Neville LLP

In a move intended to emphasize that FINRA’s ultimate mandate is to protect investors, the SRO’s National Adjudicatory Council last week issued newly-revised Sanction Guidelines including tougher ranges of recommended punishments to be meted out against member firms or brokers who commit fraud or make unsuitable recommendations to customers.

Since 1993, FINRA has maintained and published “Sanction Guidelines” setting forth common securities rule violations and the range of disciplinary actions FINRA can issue for such violations, including monetary fines as well as suspensions, bars from the industry and other sanctions.

Specifically, the revised Guidelines, announced in Regulatory Notice 15-15 available on FINRA’s website at www.finra.org, contain revisions to the Sanctions relating to two specific areas: (i) fraud, misrepresentations or material omissions of fact; and (ii) suitability and the making of unsuitable recommendations to investing customers. According to the Notice, the ramped-up sanctions are meant to reinforce that fraudulent conduct is unacceptable, and that FINRA adjudicators on the Regulatory side should consider strong sanctions for such conduct, including barring or expelling repeat offenders, particularly where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating ones. With regard to unsuitability, the heightened punishments include an increase in the high-end range of suspensions from one year to two, as well as recommending bars, suspensions or expulsions for the most egregious recidivists.

Published on: May 8, 2015

SEC Charges Veros Partners Alleging $15 Million Ponzi Scheme

By Lax & Neville LLP

On April 22, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filed a Complaint in the District Court for the United States Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division (the “Complaint”), against Veros Partners, Inc., Matthew D. Habb, Jeffery B. Risinger, Veros Farm Loan Holding LLC, Tobin J. Senefeld, FarmGrowCap LLC, and PinCap LLC alleging that Veros Partners, Inc. and Mr. Habb, its president, propagated and executed a Ponzi scheme and “fraudulently raised at least $15 million from at least 80 investors … mostly from Veros’ own clients, in two separate farm loan offerings.”

The Complaint states that SEC seeks “to enjoin Defendants from raising additional investor funds, to prevent them from ensnaring more victims in their scheme, and to prevent the further dissipation of investor assets.” The SEC also seeks “the disgorgement of Defendants’ ill-gotten gains, as well as prejudgment interest and significant civil penalties.”

The Ponzi-scheme offerings took place from 2013 to 2014, when investors purchased securities issued by Veros Farm Loan Holding LLC and FarmGrowCap LLC, two companies run by Matthew D. Habb, Jeffrey B. Risinger and Tobin J. Senefeld. Investors were told that their funds would be used “to make short-term operating loans to farmers for the 2013 and 2014 growing seasons.” Although some funds were used for the stated purpose, most was used to cover the unpaid debt of the farms, and $7 million was used to pay investors in other, unrelated offerings. Further, over $800,000 went directly to Matthew D. Habb, Jeffrey B. Risinger and Tobin J. Senefeld for “success” and “interest rate spread” fees.

Published on: May 8, 2015

FINRA Fines LPL for Failure to Supervise on Complex Products

By Lax & Neville LLP

What are non-traditional exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and non-traded real estate investment trusts (REITs)? Why are independent broker dealers selling these complex products without proper supervision? FINRA wants to know and just slammed LPL Financial for doing such a thing.

This week, FINRA censured and fined LPL $10 million for broad supervisory failures in the sale of complex products such as leveraged ETFs and non-traded REITS. It also ordered LPL to pay an additional $1.7 million in restitution to certain customers who bought non-traditional ETFs.

This is a watershed moment for these and other complex products. First, LPL has over 14,000 brokers nationwide and is by a wide margin the largest independent broker dealer in the U.S. (Lincoln Financial Network with over 8,000 brokers is second). The biggest independent broker-dealer getting hit like this by FINRA is the equivalent of FINRA fining the old Merrill Lynch in wire house terms.

Published on: May 1, 2015

Liability of Commercial Banks for Investment Advisor Fraud

By Lax & Neville LLP

An increasing issue in investment fraud cases is the liability of commercial banks for aiding and abetting fraud by an investment advisory firm that engages in fraud and then goes defunct. Such firms typically house their investment clients’ accounts with an independent broker dealer clearing firm that clears or processes the trading activity of the advisor. Cases against the clearing firm are typically resolved in arbitration at FINRA, and are subject to strong legal defenses based on claims of limited or nonexistent obligations of the clearing firm to the investor. Proof of the clearing firm’s knowledge and participation or knowing assistance in the fraud can sometimes be difficult, and what if the clearing firm itself has minimal assets? Another avenue to explore is the liability of the commercial bank that housed the non-investment bank accounts of the investment advisor. In the context of Ponzi schemes, such as Madoff, court cases have been brought with mixed results. But there are other forms of advisor misconduct that can implicate the bank as well.

When the nature of the fraud is outright theft or diversion of investor funds by the advisor this can occur through improper use by the advisor of its bank accounts. For example, the advisor may keep a bank account in its name and deposit customer funds into it, through various means, including having the check made out to the advisor “for the benefit of ” or “FBO” the investor. After the funds are deposited in the bank account in the name of the advisor it can often readily be stolen or diverted from the account by the advisor. Traditionally, bank laws have been structured to protect the banks from liability for routine check processing functions absent proof of aiding and abetting fraud. In the check processing part of the bank, until relatively recently, there would ordinary be little evidence of knowledge by the bank of wrongdoing. However, with the advent of strict anti-money laundering laws and regulations (AML), banks must now monitor for and report suspicious activity. Thus, improper activity by the advisor of the nature described above should be flagged by the bank’s own surveillance system. If the “red flags” of wrongful activity by the advisor in its bank accounts are disregarded by the bank, this can constitute evidence of the bank’s knowledge of and responsibility for the fraudulent activity. Expect to see more court cases being filed against commercial banks for investor losses stemming from fraudulent activity of investment advisors who manipulate their commercial bank accounts to cheat investors.

Published on: April 24, 2015

FINRA Fines H. Beck, Inc. $ 425,000 to Settle Sales Practice Violations Regarding Unit Investment Trusts

By Lax & Neville LLP

On March, 30, 2015, H. Beck Inc. (“H. Beck”) submitted a Letter of Acceptance Waiver, and Consent (“AWC”) to settle allegations of sales practice violations by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). FINRA alleged that: 1) H. Beck failed to establish a reasonable supervisory system and written supervisory procedures to identify and apply applicable unit investment trust (“UIT”) sales charge discounts to customers; 2) H. Beck failed to reasonably supervise its registered representatives’ use of consolidated reports; and 3) H. Beck failed to enforce its written supervisory procedures regarding its non-registered representatives’ use of outside email accounts. Without admitting or denying the facts alleged in the AWC, H. Beck submitted to censure and paid civil fines of $ 425,000 to settle the FINRA allegations. A full version of the FINRA AWC may be found here.

A UIT is a type of investment company that issues securities representing an undivided interest in a portfolio of securities. UITS are usually issued by a sponsor that assembles the portfolio of securities, deposits the securities in a trust, and then sells units through a public offering. Each UIT unit is a redeemable security that is issued for a specific term and entitles the investor to a proportionate share of the UIT’s net assets. The UIT sponsor usually offers a variety of different ways for investors to reduce the sales charges for their purchases, such as offering a discount on purchases that are funded from Redemption proceeds from another UIT.

In the AWC, FINRA noted that on March 31, 2004, FINRA reminded its members of their obligation to develop written supervisory procedures to ensure that customers receive the appropriate sales charge discounts for their UIT investments. See NTM 04-26, Unit Investment Trust Sales. FINRA’s guidance instructs its members to make sure that UIT transactions take place “on the most advantageous terms available to the customer.” Specifically, the AWC alleges that, in violation of NASD Conduct Rule 2110 and FINRA Rule 2010, from October 2008 through September 2013, H. Beck failed to give customers discounts for approximately $ 23 million of UIT investments purchase. Additionally, for its failure to implement written supervisory procedure reasonably designed to ensure that customers received sales charge discounts, FINRA alleged that H. Beck violated NASD Conduct Rules 3010(a)-(b) and 2110, as well as FINRA Rule 2010.

Published on: April 22, 2015

Merrill Lynch Fined for Faulty Trade Reporting

By Lax & Neville LLP

Merrill Lynch was fined almost $20 million by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in London for incorrectly reporting more than 35 million transactions from 2007 to 2014. Merrill Lynch didn’t report, at all, another 120,000 transactions. It’s the largest fine ever levied by the FCA for reporting failures. While this may not seem like a big deal to the investing public, it is. The proper reporting of transactions is a hallmark of the securities industry. Without it, during tumultuous times, investors will not have a perfect view of the trades that occurred in their portfolios. Indeed, for some of the transactions, Merrill didn’t identify the counterparties on trades. This is problematic for over the counter derivative investors because investors couldn’t ascertain counterparty risk on their trades and if the trades went bad, it would be impossible for the investor to know how to potentially resolve the issue. What’s worse is that the FCA had warned Merrill in 2002 and fined Merrill in 2006 for the same types of infractions. In today’s fragmented, digital marketplace, proper reporting is absolutely necessary. Let’s hope the record fine is a wake up to call Merrill and others.

Here is a New York Times piece on it.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/business/dealbook/british-regulator-fines-merrill-lynch-19-8-million-for-reporting-failures.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0