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On December 23, 2021, a team of seven former Credit Suisse investment advisers represented by Lax & Neville LLP won a $9.5 million FINRA arbitration award against Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC for unpaid deferred compensation. See Prezzano et al. vs. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, FINRA No. 19-02974. This comes just weeks after another FINRA Panel awarded $9 million to a team of eight former Credit Suisse investment advisers represented by Lax & Neville. See Hutchinson et al. vs. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 16-02825.

These teams are now among the numerous former Credit Suisse advisors who have successfully brought claims for their portion of the over $200 million of deferred compensation that Credit Suisse refused to pay its advisors when it closed its US private bank in 2015, violating the advisers’ employment agreements and the firm’s own deferred compensation plans. The advisors were terminated without cause when the firm closed its US private bank. As it did with respect to almost every one of more than 300 advisers, and in each and every one of the deferred compensation cases filed against it, Credit Suisse took the position that the advisors voluntarily resigned and forfeited their earned deferred compensation when Credit Suisse closed their branches and eliminated their positions. The FINRA Panels unanimously found that Credit Suisse terminated each of the advisors without cause, breached their employment agreements, and violated their respective states’ labor laws.

Nine arbitrations have gone to award thus far, including seven brought by Lax & Neville LLP. See Prezzano et al. vs. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, FINRA No. 19-02974, Hutchinson et al. vs. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 16-02825Galli, et al. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 17-01489DellaRusso and Sullivan v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 17-01406Lerner and Winderbaum v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 17-00057Finn v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 17-01277; and Chilton v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 16-03065. All nine FINRA arbitration panels, three New York Supreme Court Commercial Division Judges (Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Finn, Index No. 655870/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019); Lerner and Winderbaum v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Index No. 652771/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. DellaRusso and Sullivan, Index No. 657268/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)), and a unanimous panel of the New York Appellate Division have found for the advisers and ordered Credit Suisse to pay the deferred compensation it owes them.

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Although some registered representatives and financial firms downplay the risks involved with options trading, in reality, options trading can be an aggressive strategy that may entail high risks.  Because of the risks associated with option trading, it is generally only suitable for investors with a high net worth, experience, and an appetite for risk.  Brokers, financial advisors, and financial firms sometimes ignore a customer’s tolerance for risk and improperly approve options trading in the customer’s account.  Unfortunately, this can lead to tremendous losses in their accounts.  RIK recently filed several multi-million-dollar cases on behalf of investors to recover for losses relating to improper options trading.

Options are contracts that grant an investor the right, but not obligation, to buy or sell an underlying asset at a set price on or before a specific date.  Options trading has become popular amongst investors in recent years.  To be successful, options trading requires research, discipline, and constant market monitoring.  This type of trading involves high risk and requires special approval from the financial firm.

From the outset, options trading often comes with excessive fees which incentivizes brokers and advisors to recommend options trading to their clients regardless of the clients’ investment objectives and willingness to take on risk.  In doing so, the broker or advisor sometimes downplays the risks associated with an options trading strategy by claiming that the only potential downside is the initial cost of the contract or that the advisor can hedge the position.  Both notions can be misleading.  First, the investor pays a premium for options in addition to paying high commission fees.  This means the investor is at a loss the moment an option is purchased.  Secondly, hedging options is highly dependent on market conditions and is an extremely risky strategy in the current volatile market.

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In recent years, options trading has become more popular with investors.  Because of the high risks associated with options trading, FINRA imposes specific rules and guidelines relating to trading options and which accounts can be approved for options trading.  For example, firms are required to have an options principal oversee option trading in accounts.  Moreover, in April 2021, FINRA sent a notice to members reminding them that, “[r]egardless of whether the account is self-directed or options are being recommended, members must perform due diligence on the customer and collect information about the customer to support a determination that options trading is appropriate for the customer.”  See FINRA, Notice to Members 21-15 (2021).

FINRA’s recent investigations and sanctions against financial institutions, brokers, and advisors for options-related violations demonstrate how serious rules relating to options approval and option trading are.  For example, last month FINRA imposed its largest financial penalty ever against Robinhood Financial LLC, in part, for failing to exercise due diligence before approving investors for options trading in self-directed accounts.  Below are other recent examples of options-related sanctions FINRA imposed on firms and individuals:

  • Cambridge Research, Inc. was censured, fined $400,000, and ordered to pay over $3,000,000 in restitutions for improper conduct relating to the firms “risky strategies” that relied on purchasing uncovered options – options where the seller does not hold the underlying stock and is required to have an option margin to show the ability to purchase the stock when needed (FINRA Case No. 2018056443801);
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Wall Street’s fastest growing trend is investing in Special Purpose Acquisitions Companies (“SPACs”).  SPACs are a way for private companies to go public without having to go through the traditional IPO process.  SPACs have been around for decades but have recently gained popularity in companies seeking to go public in this period of high market volatility.  Historically, SPACs were viewed as extremely risky investments.  The recent rise in SPACs does not change the high risks associated with them.  Some brokers and financial advisors ignore these risks and recommend customers invest in SPACs regardless of the customer’s investment profile and appetite for risk.  RIK’s investment fraud lawyers have extensive experience handling these types of cases and recovering losses for customers.

SPACs, also known as blank check companies, are companies created and publicly traded for the sole purpose of buying or merging with a private company in the future, known as the target company.  SPACs disclose criteria about the what kind of target company or companies it seeks.  Despite these disclosures, which are usually very limited and loosely defined, investors of the SPAC have no idea what the eventual acquisition company will be.  In other words, investors are going in blind.

In using SPACs to go public, private companies forego the process of registering an IPO with the SEC, meaning there is less oversight from the SEC.  The SPAC process also permits private companies to go public in a substantially shorter time period than a conventional IPO.  As one might suspect, the due diligence of the SPAC process is not as rigorous as a traditional IPO and no one is looking out for the best interests of investors.  Even worse, SPAC managers are not incentivized to obtain the best possible deal for investors – their job is to get a merger deal, not get the best deal.  Not surprisingly, this can lead to substantial harm to investors.  For example, the SPAC company may be overpaying for the target company – meaning investors are losing on the deal.

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On March 11, 2021, a FINRA arbitrator awarded expungement relief to George D. Ewins Jr. and Richard J. Kowalski, former Merrill Lynch financial advisors.  Ewins and Kowalski were represented by Robert J. Moses of Lax & Neville LLP.  Ewins and Kowalski sought expungement of a customer complaint from their registration records maintained by the Central Registration Depository (“CRD”).  CRD is the central licensing and registration system for the securities industry and its regulators, which contains information made available to the public via FINRA’s BrokerCheck. Pursuant to FINRA Rules 2080 and 13805, an arbitrator may grant an expungement of customer dispute information from a registered representative’s CRD record.  In the underlying arbitration filed by the customers, the customers alleged that Ewins, Kowalski, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America (“BOA”) sold Merrill Lynch proprietary volatility indices linked to structured notes known as Strategic Return Notes which were unsuitable in light of their investment objectives.  Merrill Lynch and Bank of America settled with the customers which resulted in the customers’ not having any out-of-pocket losses.  Ewins and Kowalski did not contribute to the settlement.

Pursuant to FINRA Rule 13805 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure (“Code”), the FINRA arbitrator in the expungement proceeding made the following FINRA Rule 2080 affirmative finding of fact: “[t]he claim, allegation, or information is false.”  According to the Award, the arbitrator reached this conclusion “based upon the fact that neither Ewins nor Kowalski was responsible for the failure of Merrill Lynch and BOA to make the requisite disclosures concerning the fixed costs associated with the Strategic Return Notes. Both Ewins and Kowalski testified credibly that they performed necessary due diligence before they recommended the Strategic Return Notes for the customers. There is no reason to conclude that either Ewins or Kowalski could have reasonably questioned the validity, accuracy and completeness of the Strategic Return Notes offering materials prior to the SEC and FINRA actions. One of the customers who filed the underlying arbitration submitted a detailed written response to Ewins and Kowalski’s request for expungement and testified at the expungement hearing that he “personally do[es] not have a problem with a potential expungement of the petitioner[s’] record[s] if they have met the burden for their record to be cleared,” and that he did not want Ewins and Kowalski to have adverse consequences from having the disclosures on their CRDs.

As noted by the arbitrator in the Award, Merrill Lynch agreed to pay a $10 million penalty to settle charges by the SEC that Merrill Lynch violated securities laws and was responsible for misleading statements in offering materials provided to retail investors for structured notes linked to a proprietary volatility index.  Merrill Lynch also agreed to a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (“AWC”) with FINRA in connection with the same disclosure violations.

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On February 4, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) charged three individuals and affiliated entities with running “a Ponzi-like scheme” that raised over $1.7 billion by selling unregistered, high commission private placements issued by GPB Capital Holdings, an alternative asset management firm.  The SEC alleges that David Gentile, the owner and CEO of GPB Capital, and Jeffry Schneider, the owner of GPB Capital’s placement agent Ascendant Capital, lied to investors about the source of money used to make the annual distribution payments to investors.  According to the Complaint filed by the SEC in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, GPB Capital actually used money raised from investors to pay portions of the annualized 8% distribution payments due on private placements sold to earlier investors.  The SEC complaint alleges that GPB Capital, Mr. Gentile, and former GPB Capital managing partner, Jeffrey Lash, manipulated the financial statements of certain funds managed by GPB Capital to give the false appearance that the funds’ income was sufficient to cover the distribution payments – when in fact it was not.

In addition, the SEC complaint alleges that GPB Capital allegedly violated whistleblower protection laws by including language in separation agreements that forbade individuals from coming forward to the SEC, and by retaliating against whistleblowers.

Financial advisors sold GPB Capital private placement investments to their customers, including retirees and unsophisticated investors.  The 8% annual distribution payment appealed to investors.  Those payments, however, stopped in 2018.  In 2019, GPB’s chief financial officer was indicted and GPB Capital reported sharp losses across its funds.  Following the announcement, some broker-dealers allegedly instructed their broker-dealer clients to remove GPB issued private placements from their platforms within 90 days.  Investors of the GPB private placement investments paid as much as 12% of the money they invested to broker-dealers in the form of fees and commissions.   Brokers and financial advisors allegedly touted and pushed these investments onto their clients, thousands of which are retirees and unsophisticated, and in some instances over concentrated their portfolios in GPB Capital.  Private placement investments are risky investments only suitable for sophisticated, accredited investors who understand the risks and can afford to lose their investment.  Financial advisors and brokers have duties to recommend investments that are suitable to their clients and perform due diligence on the investment products they recommend and sell to investors.  If your financial advisor sold GPB Capital investments to you, you may have a claim to recover your investment losses.

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Yes, many investors have filed claims to recover losses sustained as a result of their investments in NYC REIT, a real estate investment trust that purports to own “a portfolio of high-quality” commercial real estate located within the five boroughs of New York City.  This REIT began as a non-traded REIT, meaning it was not traded on an open exchange, making it is highly illiquid.  Not only was it difficult for investors to get out of their positions, share prices have dropped substantially since its initial private stock offering.  Investors were led to believe returns on the investment would exceed 10% on an annualized basis, but in reality, NYC REIT turned out atrocious for investors.  The securities lawyers at Rich, Intelisano & Katz (RIK) have been highly successful in recovering losses for investors who had positions in non-traded REIT investments.

NYC REIT is not a high-quality investment with annual returns exceeding 10%.  On the contrary, this REIT, like all REITs, is high risk and only suitable for a limited pool of investors – savvy investors who are wealthy and sophisticated with a long-term investment horizon.  First, NYC REIT is a non-traded REIT, which means it is significantly less liquid than REITs that trade on an open exchange.  As such, when investors want to sell their position, they are forced to sell their shares at a heavily discounted price.  Thus, non-traded REITs are rarely a suitable investment for most investors.  Second, NYC REIT owns only 8 mixed-use office and retail condominium buildings (which is miniscule compared to other REITS).  The limited portfolio creates an inherent high risk, such as limited diversification, less exposure to potential tenants, and the lack of ability to spread costs over a larger portfolio.  Unfortunately, NYC REIT severely underperformed and the risk associated with it became realized for many investors.

The NYC REIT was disastrous from the beginning.  The initial private stock offering price of the REIT was $25 per share.  By 2018, the price per share plummeted over 50%.  The board then decided to suspend future distributions – hurting investor cash flow.  Then, the board authorized a reverse stock split, an action that consolidates the number of existing shares of stock into fewer, proportionally more valuable shares (generally, a move to boost the company’s image if the stock price has dropped dramatically).  Then, when the REIT went public in August 2020, it was a complete failure.  NYC REIT, now trading on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) under the symbol “NYC,” dropped in value approximately 40% on the first day.  This abrupt decrease in share price left investors with significant losses.

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Lax & Neville LLP is investigating claims involving Amarin, a speculative biotech stock recommended and sold to investors by financial advisors. Amarin is a biopharmaceutical company with one significant commercial product, Vascepa, a fish oil drug designed to reduce cardiovascular risk among patients with elevated risks of cardiovascular events and elevated triglyceride levels.  Amarin’s stock skyrocketed from $3 a share to $18 a share in a single day following the release of positive clinical data in September 2018, (and traded in that range, including in the mid to low $20s during the next 18 months), but declined to low single digits in March 2020 after losing a key patent litigation decision.  See Amarin Pharma v. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-02525-MMD-NJK (D. Nev. 2016).  The patent litigation was a known risk to the stock, and eventually caused a collapse in Amarin’s share price.

Upon information and belief, financial advisors at Morgan Stanley and other brokerage firms solicited and concentrated customer accounts in Amarin, even while the company was defending its patent on Vascepa in litigation.  This litigation was a material risk in any Amarin investment.  If generic versions of Vascepa could enter the market, Amarin’s sales would be substantially reduced, and even if the introduction of generic versions did not start right away, the perception that their development would create could also materially impact Amarin’s value and stock price.

Upon information and belief, financial advisors failed to adequately disclose the risks of investing in Amarin and in having concentrated positions in one stock.  Financial advisors have duties, including a fiduciary duty, to provide customers with full and fair disclosure of all material facts, such as the risks of litigation, the ongoing risks of overconcentration; and to diversify an investor’s portfolio.  Financial advisors also have a duty to continually update “buy,” “hold,” and “sell” recommendations for any security.  Financial advisors must develop a suitable plan for customers’ investments, and to recommend transactions and investment strategies only where they have a reasonable basis to believe that their recommendations are suitable for the customer based on the customer’s financial needs, investment objectives, investment experience, risk tolerance, and other information that they know and have obtained about the customer.  An investment in Amarin, particularly in concentrated positions is risky and not suitable for all investors.  The failure by a financial advisor to provide suitable investment advice with fair and balanced risk disclosures is a violation of his or her fiduciary duties and other duties.

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