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On February 2, 2023, another former Credit Suisse investment adviser represented by Lax & Neville LLP won a FINRA arbitration award against Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC for unpaid deferred compensation.  See James D. Garrity v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, FINRA No. 20-03957.  Lax & Neville has tried eight arbitrations resulting in awards of more than $32 million to 26 former Credit Suisse advisers.

The claimant, James Garrity, is now among the numerous former Credit Suisse advisors who have successfully brought claims for their portion of the over $200 million of deferred compensation that Credit Suisse refused to pay its advisors when it closed its US private bank in 2015, violating the advisers’ employment agreements and the firm’s own deferred compensation plans. Credit Suisse took the position, as it has with hundreds of other former investment advisers, that Mr. Garrity voluntarily resigned and forfeited his deferred compensation. A three-arbitrator panel awarded Mr. Garrity compensatory damages in the amount of $1,018,624.89 and prejudgment interest in the amount of $363,244.20. The Panel also ordered Credit Suisse to pay $51,000 in FINRA forum fees.

Lax & Neville LLP has won more than $32 million in compensatory damages, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees on behalf of former Credit Suisse investment advisers. To discuss these FINRA arbitration Awards, please contact Barry R. Lax, Brian J. Neville, Sandra P. Lahens or Robert R. Miller at (212) 696-1999.

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HJ Sims & Co. Inc. (“HJ Sims”) appears to have used Regulation D (“Reg D”) offerings to pass its risk of loss onto its customers while it retained the potential for significant gains.  A scheme like this would violate numerous FINRA Rules and regulations, including suitability, Regulation BI (“Reg BI”), and due diligence obligations.  See FINRA’s Due Diligence and Suitability of Private Placement.  RIK’s investment lawyers are currently investigating potential claims related to HJ Sims’ possible improper sales practices.

Reg D securities are non-public offerings designed to help operating firms raise funding, and are exempt from certain security registration requirements.  This type of private placement is offered by the “issuer,” and who, under the rules, is only required to make limited disclosures regarding the price of the offering – making it more challenging for investors to determine a fair price of the private placement when compared to publicly traded investments.

In the past 10 years, HJ Sims sold 93 Reg D Offerings (listed below), where most of the issuers of the Reg D bonds were owned and/or controlled by HJ Sims executives.  Because of this, not only did HJ Sims gain commissions and other fees associated with the offerings, “[i]f a Sims’ Reg D offering failed, the executives would suffer a portion of the losses but realize all the gains if an offering succeeded.”  See HJ Sims Reg D Offerings: Heads, HJ Sims Wins – Tails, Their Investors Lose.  Ultimately, the risks associated with the Reg D offerings were passed onto the customers.  As stated by SLCG Economic Consulting, “HJ Sims ability to shift losses to its clients would naturally lead it to invest in riskier projects with unusually high likelihood of failure.”  See id.

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The investment fraud attorneys at Rich, Intelisano & Katz won a $5.2 million FINRA arbitration award for their clients, George and Sandra Schussel, in a case relating to UBS’s Yield Enhancement Strategy (“YES”).  Investors in YES, including the Schussels, suffered significant losses in December 2018.  Many investors in YES have since filed FINRA claims against UBS.  To date, over 40 of the filed claims have gone to award – approximately half have been in favor of investors while half favored UBS.  RIK has been successful in representing multiple YES investors.  The September 15, 2022 award of $5.2 million represents the largest YES-related award against UBS to date and an approximately 95% recovery for our clients.  Read the full award here.

During the Schussels’ arbitration, RIK’s attorneys stressed that recommending a strategy that the advisor did not fully understand is inherently a breach of their fiduciary duty.  After eight days of hearings, the panel unanimously awarded the Schussels over $5,200,000 including $95,000 in pre-judgment interest and $92,000 in costs.  The significant award has received the following press coverage: FA-mag, Barron’s, and InvestmentNews.

UBS’s YES strategy is an options overlay strategy which uses investors’ conservative investments as collateral for iron condor options trading.  UBS’s financial advisors marketed it as a moderate risk strategy designed to gain additional incremental investment income.  Despite UBS’s disclosure statements, UBS never adequately disclosed the true risks of YES – that it was a high risk, low reward strategy.  As such, investors in YES, including the Schussels, were shocked to discover significant losses in their YES accounts in December 2018.

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On September 9, 2022, the Superior Court of the State of California entered judgment on a FINRA Arbitration Award against Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, ordering it to pay more than $10 million to seven investment advisors formerly employed in the Los Angeles and San Francisco branches of its now-closed US private bank. This follows the July 8, 2022 decision of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois confirming an award against Credit Suisse and entering a $9.5 million judgment for eight advisors in Chicago.

These fifteen advisors are among the more than three hundred Credit Suisse laid off when it closed its US private bank in 2015.  Credit Suisse purported to “cancel” the more than $200 million in earned and vested deferred compensation it owed its three hundred advisors by claiming each of them voluntarily resigned at the same time Credit Suisse was closing their branches and eliminating their positions.  The FINRA Panels in Los Angeles and Chicago, like eight other FINRA Panels thus far, unanimously found that Credit Suisse terminated the advisors without cause, breached their employment agreements, and violated their respective states’ labor laws, the California Labor Code (“CLC”) and Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”).  The FINRA Panels ordered Credit Suisse to pay the deferred compensation, statutory interest and penalties, and a total of more than $2 million in attorneys’ fees and costs.

Credit Suisse subsequently petitioned to vacate the FINRA Panels’ Awards.  Among other grounds, Credit Suisse contended that the FINRA Panels exceeded their authority when they determined that Credit Suisse had violated the labor law and awarded statutory attorneys’ fees.  The California and Illinois Courts disagreed, denying the petitions to vacate in all respects and confirming the Awards, including the labor law violations and more than $2 million in attorneys’ fees and costs.

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Annuities are insurance contracts that make routine payments to customers either immediately or at some point in the future.  This insurance contract allows investors to protect and grow their retirement savings while providing them with guaranteed income.  Some brokers and financial advisors recommend selling or exchanging annuities for “better” investment opportunities.  However, liquidating or exchanging an annuity comes with a high price– commissions, tax implications, and the loss of benefits associated with the original annuity.  For these reasons, liquidating or exchanging an annuity without very clear financial reasons may be  unsuitable for customers.  The securities fraud lawyers at Rich, Intelisano & Katz, LLP (RIK) have recovered millions for investors who suffered from annuity-related losses.

When investors sell or exchange their annuities, it comes with a heavy price.  First, when customers sell their annuity, they are subjected to costly fees and penalties.  For example, the customer may incur surrender charges and high cancellation fees.  Second, customers will lose all benefits associated with the annuity, such as legacy protection which is a death benefit to help provide a legacy for your loved ones.  Third, the customer forfeits expected benefits from the annuity– the customer will no longer have guaranteed income.  Fourth, taxes may become immediately due on the proceeds.  Lastly, there are often high commissions associated with the sale of annuities.

Regardless of the costs and losses associated with selling or exchanging annuities, brokers and financial advisors sometimes recommend such actions to customers in order to generate commissions for themselves.  Essentially, liquidating or exchanging annuities could potentially be a scheme for your broker or advisor to take money out of your savings and put it into their pocket.  What’s worse is that the broker or advisor will use your money from the sale of the annuity to purchase another annuity or other investment products further increasing commissions and fees.  Just like with any scheme to take advantage of customers, this is ill-suited and exceedingly improper.

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Many investors of UBS’s Yield Enhancement Strategy (“YES”), if not all, would never have invested in YES if UBS made full and fair disclosures related to its risks.  YES was marketed as an overlay strategy for additional incremental investment income.  Put simply, UBS advertised YES as an “iron condor” strategy that used customers’ investment accounts as collateral for options trading.  Customers that enrolled in the strategy were required to sign disclosure documents, including margin agreements and options forms.  Despite these disclosure documents, UBS never adequately disclosed the true risks of YES – that it was a high risk, low reward strategy.  Because of UBS’s failure to adequately disclose the nature of YES, investors were shocked to learn about their astronomical losses at the end of 2018, and again in early 2020.

Generally, when investors trade on margin or trade options, they are required to sign risk disclosure documents.  Enrolling in YES was no exception – as it is an options strategy that trades on margin.  However, when YES investors were opening YES accounts, some UBS financial advisors downplayed the significance of the risk disclosure forms.  For example, in several cases handled by Rich, Intelisano & Katz (“RIK”), the financial advisors dismissed the written disclosures describing them as boilerplate and/or stating that the YES portfolio manager limited risk by employing a low risk “iron condor” strategy.  Representations such as these undermine the legal effect of the risk disclosure documents.  Moreover, because the YES accounts are professionally managed, UBS and its financial advisors have a duty of full and fair disclosure regarding the investment the Firm recommends to its investors and to not mislead its customers.  See S.E.C. v. Cap. Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (“Courts have imposed on a fiduciary an affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,’ as well as an affirmative obligation ‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading his clients.’”)  Such conduct falls well below that standard.

RIK’s lawyers have pursued several multi-million dollar arbitrations on behalf of investors to recover for losses sustained due to UBS’s YES program (read more here).  It is no surprise that UBS has attempted to shield itself from liability by hiding behind the risk disclosure forms.  Not only were the communications related to the risk disclosure documents improper, but the disclosure documents themselves were entirely deficient because they contained a number of ambiguous, contradictory, and misleading statements concerning risk that further undermine the disclosures’ purported legal effect.  For instance, in addition to generically disclosing risks, the disclosure documents also state specifically how risks associated with YES were mitigated or limited.  These mitigation statements give investors a false impression that the strategy is protected from the high risks described in the “boilerplate” disclosure documents.

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Major bracket Wall Street banks have only recently institutionalized substantial retirement packages for senior advisors to sunset out with very few restrictions. Inheriting advisors who care to take over these books of businesses face an enormous opportunity to convert these books, yield a solid short-term return, and a terrific long-term opportunity to own and grow these books.

However, for these inheriting advisors, the rules associated with the restrictive covenants, the non-solicitation clauses, and the timeframe to yield any return differ substantially at Merrill’s CTP program from those at Morgan Stanley’s FAP program, Wells Fargo Summit Program, and UBS’s Alpha Program.

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The legal nuances behind making a move to a new firm partner intimidate many an advisor, but it’s time to move past that block. In this first episode in Advisor Talk’s Legal Perspective Series, Elite Consulting Partners CEO Frank LaRosa is joined by Brian Neville, Founding Partner of Lax & Neville, to provide insight and context to listeners as to best legal practices when making a transition.

In particular, this episode focuses on client solicitations when making a move. Topics covered by Frank and Brian include:

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Need legal tips for your financial advisor practice? Recent media coverage of an advisor’s transition from RBC to UBS and then back to RBC has shone a light on the legal missteps an advisor can make when moving their book of business to a new firm partner. In this episode, Elite Consulting Partners CEO Frank LaRosa is joined by Brian Neville, Founding Partner of Lax & Neville LLP, for a discussion that puts their substantial combined industry expertise to work and tackles the broad topic of the legal side of transitions, providing advisors with insights that prove practical and actionable.

Topics covered in the conversation include:

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Lax & Neville LLP has successfully brought claims on behalf of former Credit Suisse investment advisers for their portion of the over $200 million of deferred compensation that Credit Suisse refused to pay its advisors when it closed its US private bank in 2015, violating the advisers’ employment agreements and the firm’s own deferred compensation plans. Nine have gone to award thus far, including seven brought by Lax & Neville LLP totaling 172 hearing days and resulting in awards of more than $30 million to 25 former Credit Suisse advisers. See Prezzano et al. vs. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, FINRA No. 19-02974, Hutchinson et al. vs. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 16-02825Galli, et al. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 17-01489DellaRusso and Sullivan v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 17-01406Lerner and Winderbaum v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, FINRA No. 17-00057Finn v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 17-01277; and Chilton v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLCFINRA No. 16-03065. All nine FINRA arbitration panels, three New York Supreme Court Commercial Division Judges (Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Finn, Index No. 655870/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019); Lerner and Winderbaum v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Index No. 652771/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. DellaRusso and Sullivan, Index No. 657268/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)), and a unanimous panel of the New York Appellate Division have found for the advisers and ordered Credit Suisse to pay the deferred compensation it owes them.

Lax & Neville LLP has won more than $30 million in compensatory damages, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees on behalf of former Credit Suisse investment advisers. To discuss these FINRA arbitration Awards, please contact Barry R. Lax, Brian J. Neville, Sandra P. Lahens or Robert R. Miller at (212) 696-1999.

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