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The New York Times announced today that the nation’s biggest banks, according to certain “stress” tests, appear to be able to survive a serous downturn in the economy, where housing and securities markets severely decline and unemployment rises to 10%. Whether passing the stress test equates to a clean bill of heath for surviving the next serious recession depends on the metrics used to measure the banks’ health under various scenarios. Does that mean we are relying on the “quants” for the proper metrics, the math wizards who were lured away from math and scientific pursuits to help Wall Street create exotic and complicated investment products in the last 15 years? Yes. Remember that quants and their metrics gave Wall Street the cover it needed to classify risky housing securities products as investment grade, resulting in billions in losses for investors in the housing bust. It turned out the models the quants used were flawed: for one thing they sometimes didn’t go back far enough in financial history in building assumptions for the models. The banks’ passing the stress test is only as meaningful as how the stress test models are built, and we are once again in the hands of the financial quants in making that determination.

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Reuters reports that Morgan Stanley’s annual 10-K, filed March 2, 2015, indicates that the New York Attorney General intends to file a lawsuit related to 30 subprime securitizations sponsored by the company. This follows lawsuits and similar allegations by attorneys general in California, Virginia and Illinois. The New York Attorney General indicated that the lawsuit would allege that Morgan Stanley misrepresented or omitted material information related to the due diligence, underwriting and valuation of loans and properties. In the 10-K, Morgan Stanley stated that it does not agree with the allegations.

Morgan Stanley also reached a $2.6 billion agreement in principle last month with the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California to resolve claims related to what it called “residential mortgage matters.”

It remains to be seen whether investors will reap any of the benefits of these government actions seeking to mend the damage done by the subprime mortgage crisis and the proliferation of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

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A Miami-based FINRA arbitration panel has ruled that two former financial advisers of Barclays do not have to repay a total of over $3.8 million allegedly owed by them pursuant to promissory notes executed in connection with signing bonuses, despite the fact that they left the firm.

According to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-ex-barclays-advisers-can-keep-big-bonuses-1424700638, the brokers, Ileana Delahoz Platt and Rafael Enrique Urquidi, joined Barclays in 2012 and received signing bonuses in the form of “forgivable loans”, which is a customary practice in the industry. These loans, evidenced by promissory notes, are typically forgiven over time provided the employee remains employed with the firm. However, shortly after Ms. Platt and Mr. Urquidi went to work at Barclays, the bank eliminated its business in the market where their clients were located, and, according to their attorney, the advisers could no longer service many of their clients, obliging them to leave the firm to seek out other employment.

In the FINRA arbitration proceeding, Ms. Platt and Mr. Urquidi sought compensatory and other damages, as well as a declaratory judgment that any amounts due under their loan agreements would be offset and that they would owe nothing under the promissory notes. Barclays, in a counterclaim, requested compensatory damages against the two advisers in the amounts it claimed were due and owing on the promissory notes at the time they left the firm.

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Are master limited partners unsuitable for some investors? The term master limited partnership sounds like a complicated legal transaction. In fact, master limited partnerships or MLPs are complex investments that have become hugely popular in the last few years in this low interest rate environment. MLPs are tax exempt publicly traded companies that often own infrastructure in the energy field (pipelines, tanks, etc.). Individual and small institutional investors having be loading up on MLPs because they pay a large percentage of their income out to shareholders as distributions. According to Morningstar, investors added almost $12 billion in 2014 into mutual and exchange-traded funds which invest in MLPs. That’s a huge amount of hard earned money looking for higher yields. The question is, do investors understand the real risks? We doubt it.

Brokers commonly market MLPs as low risk, higher yield securities. But that’s not the case. An MLP is a publicly traded limited partnership with two types of partners: the general partner (or GP) who is responsible for managing the MLP and is compensated for performance; and the limited partner (or LP) who is the investor who provides the capital to the MLP and receives periodic income distributions. Unlike most partnerships, shares of MLPs can be bought or sold on a stock exchange. Just like any partnership, the problem with being a limited partner is that an LP has no role in the management of MLP. That’s risk number one.

Risk number two is that most MLPs invest in the natural resources infrastructure. This is normally a risky space, especially with the swings on energy and commodity prices.

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A leaked White House memo supports imposing fiduciary duties on brokers in their dealings with IRA investors, as reported by the New York Times.

Current rules provide a weaker standard for brokers. The memo estimates that the absence of adequate investor safeguards penalizes IRA holders by as much as $17 billion per year. Hopefully, this development indicates that a rule imposing a fiduciary standard will be promulgated by the U.S. Labor Department soon. The securities industry has been vigorously fighting this requirement for years, some threatening to stop offering IRAs that would be subject to the rule. Of primary concern to investors are built in conflicts of interest that brokers often have in recommending IRA investments that may be lucrative to the broker but not right for the investor. The government should err on the side of investor protection in this dispute because the securities industry has the knowledge and resources to protect future retirees, whereas many investors lack the knowledge to protect themselves in the arena of complicated investment products.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/your-money/fiduciary-duty-rule-would-protect-consumers-and-target-investment-brokers.html?_r=0

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This week, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied the appeal of an arbitration award against Merrill Lynch by the Associated Humane Societies Inc. of Tinton Falls, N.J. In the original FINRA arbitration, the society alleged that certain of its investments were improper, it improperly sustained penalties and other charges when the investments were liquidated, its accounts were improperly managed and churned, and it was overcharged for management of its accounts. The society sought $10 million in punitive damages, $872,171 in compensatory damages and $544,299 in attorneys’ fees. After an 18-day hearing, the FINRA panel found in favor of the society, but awarded it only $168,103 in compensatory damages and $126,077 in punitives.

The society appealed. A 3-judge appellate division panel upheld the award in October, finding that the FINRA panel did not abuse its discretion. Associated Humane Societies, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. L-4376-13 (Oct. 29, 2014). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied any further appeal on Feb. 17, 2015.

Though the society was ultimately disappointed with the size of the award, the decision shows the reluctance of courts to disturb FINRA arbitration awards.

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Does the conventional wisdom regarding asset allocation hold up in today’s economy? The New York Times recently featured an article suggesting that a portfolio teeming with risky stocks, derivatives, and other exotic investments may, in fact, not be suitable for even young investors. The Times points out that these young investors experience higher rates of unemployment and are more likely to cash out their 401(k)’s and other investments when they switch jobs. An appropriate suitability analysis under FINRA Rule 2111 would take these factors into account. It is highly likely that many brokers are still using a one-size-fits-all asset allocation formula for their young customers.

Investors may have a variety of claims against such brokers who fail to take into account current market conditions, including unsuitable investment advice, fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, and failure to supervise.

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Puerto Rico bond funds have been suffering massive losses recently and regulators have already taken action. According to the SEC, UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico Inc. (“UBS”) misled thousands of its retail investors in 23 of its closed-end mutual funds. While UBS has already spent more than $26 million to settle the SEC’s charges, investors are now starting to pursue their own actions against the institution to recover potentially millions in losses.

Starting in 2008, UBS began soliciting investors in its Puerto Rico bond funds by promoting the funds’ market performance and high premiums to net asset value as the result of supply and demand in a competitive and liquid secondary market. However, UBS knew about a significant “supply and demand imbalance” and internally discussed the “weak secondary market.” UBS misled investors, failing to disclose that it controlled the secondary market. In 2009, UBS withdrew its market support and sold its inventory to unsuspecting customers. At the same time, it failed to disclose that it was drastically reducing its inventory, and undercut customer orders so that UBS’s inventory could be liquidated first.

Investors may have a host of claims against UBS including fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, unsuitable investment advice, and failure to supervise.

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Lax & Neville LLP is investigating claims on behalf of investors regarding possible misconduct in connection with UBS Financial Services, Inc.’s (“UBS”) sale and marketing of the UBS Willow Fund LLC (“UBS Willow Fund”). UBS recommended the Willow Fund to its investors as a distressed debt fund. In actuality, contrary to the representations made by UBS, the Willow Fund deviated from that investment strategy, and instead invested in speculative sovereign debt credit default swaps (“CDS”). The Willow Fund’s investment in sovereign debt CDS was much riskier and speculative than the investment strategy that UBS disclosed to its customers. Therefore, UBS customers were never informed of the true nature of the Willow Fund’s investment strategy. Due to this undisclosed strategy, the Willow Fund’s value and worth drastically declined, causing investors to suffer significant losses, which could be as high as 70%.

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Lax & Neville LLP has been retained by several investors who lost money in the Aravali Fund claiming it was inappropriately sold by Deutsche Bank Securities and other brokerage firms in 2006 and 2007. The Aravali Fund was sold to investors who were seeking income and safety of principal as an alternative to a portfolio of municipal bonds. In reality, the Aravali Fund was a very risky interest rate arbitrage hedge fund, and not long after inception, the fund plummeted in excess of 90% in value and was liquidated. A large FINRA arbitration award was rendered against Deutsche Bank for sales practice abuses concerning the selling and marketing of the Aravali Fund. The FINRA arbitration panel found Deutsche Bank liable for the investor’s losses in the amount $803,850, which appears to represent about half of the client’s investment loss in the Aravali Fund. Lax & Neville has been successful in obtaining significant settlements for its clients who invested in the Aravali Fund. Investors only have (6) six years from when they purchased the Aravali Fund to file a claim. Once the (6) six years have elapsed, an investor’s claim is no longer eligible for submission to FINRA arbitration. If you have lost money investing in the Aravali Fund or have information about Deutsche Bank’s marketing of the Aravali Fund, please call Lax & Neville LLP, (212) 696-1999.

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